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1964] CASES NOTED
turbing vagueness of the rule was certainly not alleviated by the lan-
guage used in the instant case. At the best, a reconsideration is looked
for; at the least, clarification.
MICHAEL R. KLEIN
PROTECTION OF A TRADENAME IN THE ABSENCE OF
ACTUAL COMPETITION
"Kash N' Karry Wholesale Super Markets" was the tradename' for
the thirteen stores which -the plaintiff operated in the Tampa area. When
the defendant sought permission to use the same name for a similar busi-
ness in Fort Lauderdale, because the name was "catchy," the prior user
objected on the ground that he intended to expand to that area. However,
the defendant, a South Florida business, subsequently appropriated the
name, and the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the alleged unfair competi-
tion.' The Chancellor dismissed the suit with prejudice.' On appeal, held,
affirmed:in -the absence of actual competition between the litigants, a court
of equity will not enjoin the use of a tradename unless there exists a rea-
sonable probability, rather than a mere possibility, that the prior user's
business would expand to the area of the subsequent user at the time of the
alleged misappropriation. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A.,
Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
FLORIDA LAW IN NONCOMPETITIVE SITUATIONS
In noncompetitive situations, the Florida courts have extended in-
junctive relief when customer confusion is proved4 or when it may be
1. "Tradename," as used in this article, has the definition given it by the Lanham
Trademark Act. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1963). Thus, it is that name
.used by any entity "to identify their businesses, vocations or occupations." This is the
most common usage of a tradename-applying it to a business and its good will--distin-
guishing it from trademark, which as a term is applied to vendible goods for identity pur-
poses. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); Standard Oil Co. of
-N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 56 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1932); Acme Chem. Co. v. Dob-
kin, 68 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Pa. 1946). As the principles governing the protection of marks
and names are almost the same, cases involving marks are cited as authority for issues
involving names. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1297 (1940); Handler
& Pickett, Trademarks & Tradenames-An Analysis & Synthesis, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 168,
759 (.1930).
2. Tradenames may be protected in an action to restrain unfair competition. Brown
& Bigelow v. B.B. Pen Co., 191 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1951); Cook Chem. Co. v. Cook Paint
& Varnish Co., 185 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1950); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp.
98 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADEMARKS § 66.1 (2d ed. 1950).
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. .1.35(b). "Involuntary dismissal . . . .After the plaintiff has com-
pleted the presentation of his evidence, the defendant .. .may move for a dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. ...
Unless the court . . . otherwise specifies, a dismissal . . . operates as an adjudication on
the merits."
4. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (use of slogan); Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954) (infringement of name).
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presumed,5 as a matter of law, because the likelihood of such confusion is
very great. Thus, when it appears from the facts that the prior user of a
tradename will suffer from another's deceptive use of the name, or that
its use will be an imposition on the public, Florida law will justify the
granting of an injunction.6 In the instant case, the court intimated that in-
junctive relief would be granted, notwithstanding the lack of competition,
if: (1) the tradename had acquired a secondary meaning through the
efforts of the prior user; or (2) the subsequent use was accompanied by
the intent -to forestall the prior user's business; or (3) there was a reason-
able probalility of expansion by the senior user.7
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.8 is a leading
federal case interpreting the Florida law of unfair competition. The Fifth
Circuit Court noted that a cause of action may exist when appropriation
of another's name causes damage separate from actual confusion as to
source.' In that case the litigants were located in the same geographical
area, but their goods were noncompetitive, although sold at the same retail
outlets. The alleged misappropriator of the plaintiff's slogan,"° although
agreeing with the facts as alleged in the complaint, contended that such
facts would not justify the granting of an injunction. Pointing out this
lack of "product competition," the defendant argued that he had a right
to use the complainant's slogan, popularized by expensive and extensive
advertising, to his own advantage, regardless of the "confusion as to the
source" of his product or by "any dilution ... of the value . . . ."" This
argument was based on the following two cases.
5. Sentco Inc. v. McCulloh, 68 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1953) (packaging and tradename);
Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson, 67 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1953) (name and format);
Quality Courts United, Inc. v. Jones, 59 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1952) (use of the word "quality"
in advertising a motor court).
6. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 4, at 438.
The Restatement view takes into consideration that ours is a competitive society and
that a suit for unfair competition may be maintained to protect a tradename against a
party who is not in direct competition. This protection was limited to the extent of pos-
sible confusion of source in the prospective purchasers, RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 730 , com-
ment b (1938), with the possibility of expansion also a factor. Id. § 731(b). The extent of
protection in reference to territorial markets is now broadened; accordingly, the Restate-
ment encompasses the "established rule" that infringement may result in a territory where
one does no business if confusion or deception is likely. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS, In-
troduction at xiv (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
7. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711, 712 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964).
8. 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
9. Id. at 438.
10. The alleged misappropriator of the beer company's slogan, "Where there's life
there's Bud I" used it to advertise its insect repellent, "Where there's life . . . there's Bugs "
11. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir.
1962). When the junior appropriator's use of the name enables him to get a "free ride" on
the good will and reputation of the senior user, then to that extent the value of the owner's
name is diluted. Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have antidilution statutes:
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-115 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 110, § 7A (1958); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (1963). See generally Derenberg, The
Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 439 (1956);
Comment, 77 Hav. L. REV. 520 (1964).
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Stagg Shop of Miami, Inc. v. Moss12 was distinguished on the ground
that the gist of the action was actual competition. In Stagg Shop, as in
the instant case, the prior user's claim for relief was based on the conten-
tion that there was a possibility of close competition in the future."8
However, since the tradename, as related to the plaintiff's Miami Beach or
Coral Gables stores, had not been recognized or established in the Palm
Beach area, equity could not prevent a similar business located there
from using a similar name.' 4 Seeing little hope for relief on the theory
of possible actual competition, the complainants sought to obtain an in-
junction via the "confusion as to source" route. They were dealt a cru-
cial blow when, upon cross-examination, their "confused as to source" wit-
ness testified-over objection of plaintiff's council-that she purchased the
goods in the defendant-appropriator's establishment because she liked the
merchandise, and not because the name "Stagg" was on the store.'5
In Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, Inc.,'" the claim for relief was
based on customer confusion; and when this could not be proved, there
was held not to be an actionable wrong. At the common law, no one is given
the exclusive use of a tradename; relief is available only against an imi-
tator using unfair means to beguile prospective purchasers to buy his
wares while the purchasers are under the impression they are -the goods
of another."
THE SECONDARY MEANING DOCTRINE
According to the secondary meaning doctrine, a name may be pro-
tected if the public associates the name with a particular source and the
name has acquired a reputation. Until then, a name is publici juris. In
order for the doctrine to operate, the secondary meaning must have been
introduced into the geographical area of the subsequent user through the
efforts of the prior user, and before the subsequent user has appropriated
the name.' 8 Thus, a name originally incapable of exclusive appropriation
because it might be geographic or descriptive 9 nevertheless may acquire
a secondary meaning when, because of its long and exclusive use by one
establishment, the purchasing public thinks only of that establishment
upon hearing the name.20
12. 120 So.2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
13. Stagg Shop of Miami, Inc. v. Moss, 120 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
14. Id. at 42.
15. Id. at 41.
16. 226 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955).
17. Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, Inc., 226 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1955).
18. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. N.C. 1962); Tampa
Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). See generally
Note, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 256 (1953).
19. Standard Oilshares, Inc. v. Standard Oil Group, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 113, 150 Ad. 174
(1930); A. & H. Transp., Inc. v. Save Way Stations, Inc., 214 Md. 325, 135 A.2d 289
(1957); National Shoe Stores Co. v. National Shoes of N.Y., Inc., 213 Md. 328, 131 A.2d
909 (1957).
20. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1962);
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A tradename which is strong, i.e., arbitrary and fanciful, will be
protected more readily than one that is weak, merely descriptive or
geographic.2' The protection extended to a strong tradename will also
cover a larger geographical area than for a weak tradename. As long
as a word or words, coined as a tradename for a business, are invented or
coined because of the fancy of the owner, no other person or business
should be allowed to use that name unless it becomes a "generic" term. 8
It is settled law that a plaintiff who has established a right to
a tradename which is fanciful or arbitrary or has acquired a
secondary meaning is entitled to protection of his reputation
against the use of that name by others even upon noncompeting
goods, if the defendant's goods are likely to be thought to orig-
inate with the plaintiff.24
In his dissenting opinion in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich,2
5
Judge Jerome Frank expressed the more orthodox view. He argued that
the secondary meaning doctrine did not extend so far as to preclude a
girdle manufacturer from using a tradename previously appropriated by a
magazine publisher: the doctrine should be restricted to actually or po-
tentially competitive articles. Judge Frank was also concerned with the
possibility of harm to the consumer, who would have to pay more for a
protected "named" brand when a product of equal quality could have been
available for less. Furthermore, the probability of confusion was so slight
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (6th Cir. 1912), aff'd & modified sub nom.,
238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917).
21. El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954); Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein &
Co., 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 731,
comment e (1938).
22. Ibid.
23. Since a "generic" or "descriptive" word will not be protected as a tradename. Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Houston v. Berde, 211 Minn. 528, 2
N.W.2d 9 (1942).
The words "holiday," "east," "west," "by-the-sea" all seem to be descriptive or geo-
graphic and could therefore come under the category of a weak tradename. But the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the subsequent use of "Inn-by-the-Sea" when the former
owners of a Mississippi hotel of that name opened a hotel in Florida with the same name
five years after they lost the other. Rhea v. Bacon, 87 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1937). In addition
to the subsequent appropriation of the tradename, the Floridians had also duplicated certain
effigies which were placed in front of the other hotel.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to enjoin a subsequent user from having the
word "Holiday" in its tradename when the prior user was located only 80 miles away on
the same highway using the tradenames "Holiday East" and "Holiday West" in a similar
business. Zimmerman v. B. & C. Motel Corp., 401 Pa. 278, 163 A.2d 884 (1960). But cf.
Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1956); Lininger v. Desert Lodge, 63 Ariz. 239,
160 P.2d 761 (1945).
24. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948). The court
based its reasoning on cases in which the prior user was likely to suffer injury to his repu-
tation and tradename: Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945) ; L.E.
Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26
F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
25. 167 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1948).
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as to be virtually non-existent; the real basis for relief should be actual in-
jury. When relief is extended to such extraordinary cases of "probable
confusion," the complainant should prove that the defendant's product
is so sub-standard that, if the product be associated by consumers with
the plaintiff, impairment of the plaintiff's good will is a likely result.26
The courts have recognized that widespread advertising knows no
real boundaries and that the good will and reputation of a business ex-
ceeds its scope of actual trade. The tradename of that business will be
protected to the extent that the prior user's name has become known
to the purchasing public in that area at the time of the alleged misappro-
priation. If a tradename has not acquired a secondary meaning, the name
might be given limited protection against a particular defendant if the
latter selected that name for a purpose which could be detrimental to the
senior user.'
BUSINESS EXPANSION AND THE GOOD FAITH JUNIOR USER
A business and its name have a natural area of expansion." When the
junior appropriator's use lies within that area, relief should be granted."
This area to be protected for purposes of expansion falls between the zone
of actual good will on the one side and an area where good will is presently
and potentially non-existent on the other. This is the natural and reason-
able area of expansion, an area of "potential good will."'"
The determination of the area of tradename protection is largely a
26. Id. at 981. It seems almost sacrilegious to write an article on the protection of
tradenames in noncompetitive situations without including these famous words by Learned
Hand, J.:
[Ilt has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient
economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation
to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches
for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses
it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his con-
trol. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any
sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator, and another can use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized
that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against
any identification of the two, it is unlawful. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d
972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
27. Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958); Bulova
Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), af'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952) ; Adam Hat Stores,
Inc. v. Scherper, 45 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Wisc. 1942). But see Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's
Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market
Co., 206 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 937 (1953).
28. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
29. White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp., 90
F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937) ; Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16"
Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926); Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473
(D. Utah 1962).
30. Ibid.
31. 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 76.3(b). This could be referred to as the "repu-
tation zone." Ritz Carlton Hotel Co. v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Corp., 66 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.
Fla. 1946) (4th order of court).
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factual one, and each case must be decided on its own facts. 2 General
rules governing unfair competition will not suffice. 3 However, when there
is a mere possibility of expansion, but not a reasonable probability, relief
should be denied. 4 If the prior user is only "pretty sure" of expanding
and is simply "negotiating" for land in the junior user's area after
suit has been commenced, an injunction will not lie.8
In situations where neither -the senior user's tradename nor his busi-
ness has expanded into the area in which the junior appropriator is using
the tradename, 86 the good or bad faith of the alleged infringer is important,
but not dispositive. 7
In El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Caf e, 8 even though the junior user
knew at the time he established his business that the senior user was op-
erating a similar business under the same tradename 2000 miles away,
the existence of such knowledge by the junior user was not sufficient to
demonstrate fraud or deceit.39 The court based its decision on the follow-
ing factors: (1) the New York establishment did not have the exclusive
right to such a common Spanish name, since the businesses were not in di-
rect competition; (2) there was no likelihood of confusion as to source;
(3) there was no intent to benefit from the reputation or good will of the
senior user; and (4) much money was spent on advertising by the junior
user. These were held to amount to a showing of good faith. The mere
possibility of confusion of sponsorship was considered to be too far-
fetched, and the suit for an injunction was denied.
However, in Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc.,4°
evidence showed bad faith on the part of the junior appropriator of the
32. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964);
Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y. Supp. 529
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Foss v. Culbertson, 17 Wash. 2d 610, 136 P.2d 711 (1943).
33. Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., supra note 32.
34. Fairway Foods, Inc. v. Fairway Markets, Inc., 227 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955); Tampa
Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.SA., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
35. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., supra note 34.
36. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960);
El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954); Ambassador East, Inc. v.
Shelton Corners, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. N.Y. 1954)
37. Lerner Stores Corp. v. Lerner, 162 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1947); Cf. Best & Co. v.
Miller, 167 F.2d 374, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75
F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1947). "Good faith" is shown by: lack of knowledge of prior use of
the name, Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1956) ; an absence of intention to in-
jure the senior user, El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954); an
amount of money spent by the subsequent user in advertising commensurate with his volume
of business, 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 76.3.
"Bad faith" could be inferred when the subsequent user had knowledge of the name's
prior use or where no explanation was offered as to the origin of the name by the subse-
quent user. Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp 875 (S.D. Fla. 1941). Contra, Tampa
Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (1964).
38. 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954.)
39. Accord, Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1964).
40. 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961).
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tradename, a probable confusion as to sponsorship, and a lack of control
by the senior user of that name. Therefore, there was a probability of in-
jury to the senior user's reputation and good will, even though the busi-
nesses were 1500 miles apart. After alleging and proving their priority of
use and the similarity of the tradenames and operations of the businesses,
the Miami Beach complainants somehow proved to the court that from
fifty to sixty per cent of its customers come from the area of the alleged
misappropriator-Brooklyn, N.Y.4 A crucial blow to the junior appro-
priator's defense was his failure adequately to explain the origin of his
tradename" This failure implied bad faith, and injunctive relief was
granted.
A difficult situation arises when the rapidly expanding senior user
encounters another user of its tradename who was organized subse-
quently, but located prior in time in the proposed area of expansion. If
the good faith subsequent user did not attempt to use the larger user's
name to its own advantage, and the senior user's tradename had not ac-
quired a secondary meaning in the area of the local user at the time the
latter established its business,43 the court would be reluctant to enjoin
either party. In one case, rather than being granted injunctive relief the
litigants were given ninety days to work out their own solution.4 4
Of course, when a person in the exercise of ordinary care would not
confuse two businesses, and there is no actual confusion on the part
of the public, an injunction will not lie.45
CONCLUSION
When a person expends time, energy and money to build a tradename,
he wants to be assured that the name will be his alone. The courts have
formed and applied standards to protect tradenames in noncompetitive
cases, but their standards are "elastic." Since in such cases the intent of
the subsequent user of a tradename has had a bearing on the protection
granted by the courts, it would be unjust to apply a totally rigid stand-
ard.46 If the junior user is trying to "ride the coattails" of the senior
41. Id. at 303. See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 619 (1961); Caughey, The Use of
Public Polls, Surveys & Sampling as Evidence in Litigation, and Particularly Trademark &
Unfair Competition Cases, 44 CALU. L. Rv. 539 (1956).
42. Could it be possible that every person named "Moore" who wants to operate a
restaurant will have a first name of "Dinty"? For discussion see the dissenting opinion of
Moore, J., in Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F.2d 302, 304
(2d Cir. 1960).
43. Lerner Stores Corp. v. Lerner, 162 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1947); Tampa Wholesale
Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Stagg Shop of Miami,
Inc. v. Moss, 120 So.2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
44. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. N.C. 1962).
45. Cases cited note 44 supra.
46. The rationale of trademark protection is still based on the idea that one may not
"palm off" his goods as the goods of another. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, 49 Eng. Rep. 994
(Ch. 1843); Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, 49 Eng. Rep. 749 (Ch. 1842); Millington v.
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user's reputation, exploit his good will, or "poach" on an established
business, he should be stopped. But if the subsequent use was exercised
in ignorance of the prior use, and the junior user expended effort and
money to build his own good will, an application of a rigid standard would
seem harsh.
However, minimum standards to protect tradenames should be set
by precisely-worded legislation. Adequate protection necessarily would en-
tail registration and a clearing house to cross check between corporate
names, trademarks and tradenames. A central authority transcending
state government would be most desirable. 47
Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch. 1838). However, "judicial sensibilities" rather
than strict legal principles governs such protection. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).
47. Several states have adopted specific tradename statutes, naturally all territorially
limited in scope, and generally requiring a registration with the Secretary of State of a
"readily distinguishable" name. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-201 to -204 (1964); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 349 (Supp. 1963). Cf. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14400-05 (1960), which
is a codification of California's case law with no registration provision.
Florida's tradename statute is found in a section entitled "Unlawful to Counterfeit
Trademark," FLA. STAT. § 506.06 (1963), of the chapter entitled "Stamped or Marked
Bottles and Boxes":
When any person . . . adopts or uses and files . . . any label, trademark, term,
wording ... for the purpose of . . . distinguishing any goods . . . or other products
of labor as having been made . . . or put on sale by such person . . . , it shall be
unlawful to counterfeit or imitate such label, trademark, term, wording . . . or
knowingly to use . . . such label, trademark, term, wording ....
While not obviously, at first blush, a statute for the protection of tradenames, its ap-
plication by the courts has been with reference, inter alia, to the name of a restaurant,
Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1956) ; a transportation corporation, Greyhound
Corp. v. Goberna, 37 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Fla. 1941); and a shoe store, Children's Bootery
v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926). Florida requires a filing with the Secretary of
State, FLA. STAT. § 506.07 (1963), and provides for the granting of an injunction for counter-
feiting or imitating the registered tradename. FLA. STAT. § 506.09 (1963). This statute an-
nounces no standard to be applied to find a violation, and thus the courts have used the
standards as set out in Florida's common law.
The Lanham Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1963), is
the pattern for many state trademark statutes. The protection given trademarks under the
act and the state trademark statutes does not extend to tradenames. Yet by negative appli-
cation of the act, a tradename is given some protection. For example, a trademark will be
refused registration if it so resembles a tradename being used in the United States as to
be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception. 76 Stat. 769 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(1963).
Two recent cases may tend to limit state laws regarding unfair competition: Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), held that an action for unfair competi-
tion would not lie when the action is for patent infringement and the article in question is
not patented. The rationale here was that state unfair competition laws cannot be incon-
sistent with federal laws regarding a federal power-the right to grant or deny patents.
However, in 376 U.S. at 232, the Court expressly said that states "may protect businesses in
the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to
prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source
of goods."
Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), Petition for
cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEx 3236 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1964) (No. 790), interpreted the Stiffel case
as merely holding that states cannot, under the guise of regulating unfair competition, grant
what is in effect patent protection. However the petition for certiorari presents the question:
Did the Lanham Act, independently of state law, establish the federal law of un-
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True, free enterprise and honest competition are encouraged by
our economic policies, but the ingenuity of a new-comer in building
his business is also to be encouraged, and misappropriation of a trade-
name discouraged. A court's failure to condemn such misappropriation
after being brought to its attention would constitute "judicial condona-
tion of practices which violate the fundamental precepts of fair busi-
ness dealing. ' 48 However, it is clear that as to each particular case,
"The determination [must be] largely a factual one and should not be
disturbed . . . unless clearly erroneous.49
There is no doubt that in the instant case the law followed by the
district court is in accord with the majority and is the better reasoned view.
However, in applying the law to the facts, it seems that a more liberal
court could have granted injunctive relief based on the finding that the
subsequent appropriation occurred within the "area of expansion," and
that it was made with knowledge of the existence of a prior user.
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fair competition with respect to transactions involving interstate commerce, and,
if so, may a state's unfair competition law, consistently with such federal law, im-
pose liability for or prohibit use in interstate commerce of a descriptive word, if
such use is permissible under federal law?
What effect the answer has on future state court decisions regarding actions for unfair com-
petition in interstate commerce remains to be seen.
48. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 57, 296 N.Y. Supp. 176,
182 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
49. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., supra, note 43, at 714.
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